UOKI MO-ASS tSTANT OIREC
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO US ESTABLISHMENTVOLUNTEER FREEDOM CORPS"
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COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO US ESTABLISHMENTVOLUNTEER FREEDOM CORPS"
PROBLEM
To estimate Communist reactions lo US establishmentVolunteer Freedom Corps" (VFC) composed of an ti-Communist "escapees" from European Satellite States formed into national units under thc command of US officers, and towarfare measures designed to stimulate escape and enlistment in such a
Corps.
ESTIMATE
Kremlin's Estimate of the Corps' Significance
The Kremlin's primary concern with the esUblishment of the VFC would be toils significance as an Indicator of over-all US intentions toward the USSR and toward Soviet control of thc Satellite States. Much would therefore depend upon Uiecontext of US policy and action in which the VFC was presented. Regardless of Uie terms of enlistment, thc naUonal groups established, the degree of US control, and other related factors, the Kremlin wouldregard the establishment of thc VFCurther indication of US determbiatlon to liberate the Satellites. However, it would regard the VFC as partong-termnot as an indication of imminent US military action.
The Kremlin would be unlikely to regard Uie VFC as inilitarily important force. It would appreciate Uie difnculUcs inherent in the recruitment, adminlstraUon, and utilization oforce, and lt would probably estimate that Communistcould prevent il fromarge and effecUve military organ!raUon. The Kremlin would probably estimate, however, lhat in Uie event of general war the VFC could have significanceallying point for defectors.
Kremlin would probably estimatemost significant aspect of thc VFCIts psychological and subversivethe Satellite States. At the sameKremlin would estimate that ltpsychological warfarefrom establishment of the CorpsUS:by contrasting Sovietpeace with US preparationsewby stressing US recruitment ofto fight US battles. It wouldcertainly estimate thatthc VFC would generate newUie Western alliance.
Probable Communist Counteraction
The establishment of the VFC would be unlikely, of itself, to cause the "Kremlin to adopt countermeasures which, in itswould involve increased risk of general war. Neither would the Kremlin be moved by the VFC to make concessions designed to bringelaxation of tensions.
The principal Communist counter-effort would probably be an intense propaganda campaign, within and beyond the Bloc This campaign would be designed to frustrate Uie US propaganda effort in support of thc VFC by discrediting the VFCevice forEuropean "cannon/odder" to fight for US imperialism, by discrediUng- the US as
preparing for new aggressions. In contrast to Soviet efforts for peace, by stimulatingeffort and vigilance within the Bloc to counter hostile US designs, and by creating fear and dissension within the WesternIn the course of tills campaign thc Soviet. Satellite, and West Europeanagencies of the Kremlin would probablyreater alarm than the Kremlin actually felL
coordination with this propagandathe Satellite governments wouldcertainly take political action in theelsewhere to Indict the US forin their Internal affairs.governments would furthermovement of US nationals withinand might even severwith Uie US.iew toall US access to Satellite territory.
if thc Kremlin at the time ofof the VFC were engaged Jnto reduce international tensions, its
reaction might be more moderate in character and might be delayed.
he Commuxtist authorities would of course exercise their ample police powers to prevent effective recruitment for the VPC from Uie Satellite States. They woukt reinforce their already formidable frontier and internalcontrols, terrorize prospective recruits, and threaten retaliation against their families and friends. However, they would probably arrangeinimal and controlled flow of recruits designed to penetrate the Corps,or intimidate its members, establishcontrol within It, and destroy itsThc Communists would also seek to use Uie VFCeans of extending theiractivities, particularly if elements of the VFC were to be trained-ln the United SUtes.
f lor any reason Uie VFC were not athe Kremlin would certainly exploit to the full the psychological advantage thus obtained.
Original document.
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